For Lord Chelmsford , the Zulu royal army attack the camp at night & charge into it with all numbers

Hi All

The manuscript instructions of Lord Chelmsfords are forwarded for the Consideration off Officers Comdg Columns when entering Zululand.

They were found among Colonel Durnford's papers on the battlefield of Isandhlwana in May 1879 .and their signature may be Chelmsford's own...

The sixteenth of them ordered :

The possible tactics of the Zulus are as follow -

(A) Avoid the Troops and attack our line of communications-

(B) Attack the Column when on the line of march-

(C) Attack the camp at night & charge into it with all numbers

(D) Await attack in position between White , & Black Umvelosi Rivers

Incredible  ! (C) Attack the camp at night & charge into it with all numbers

A near this, some will wonder what could have happened January 22, 1879 at Isandhlwana !

Lord Chemlsford did not even have imagined that the Zulu royal army dares to attack a British camp in broad daylight !

Before the January 22, 1879, in the spirit of Lord Chemlsford, which would arrive at Isandhlwana , this was impossible !


Cheers

Pascal

Therefore Isandhlwana happened is because in the spirit of LC, it was unimaginable, and that should be the same for Pulleine ...

If they had had worries, nothing would have happened !

Only Durnford, it seems, had some worries ...

Melvill also had some worries ...

Glyn a suggested forming a wagon laager ,but this was vetoed by Lord Chelmsford , " pooh-poohed " according to Clery on the ground that " it would take a week to make".

Source :

Clery 's letter to Sir Archibald Alison in Clarke,War ,p.122.

Pascal the Rascal

Pascal MAHE wrote:

(C) Attack the camp at night & charge into it with all numbers

Over on the "Bridging two worlds..." thread Xhosa has quoted from a book authored by a Chelmsford apologist that claims nobody was expecting a daylight attack but they feared one might come in the night. Thought you might want to check it out...

Yes, I quote what was found on the corpse of the Colonel Durnford to Isandhlwana in May 1879 ,it's the manuscript instructions of Lord Chelmsfords are forwarded for the Consideration off Officers Comdg Columns when entering Zululand and their signature is of Chelmsford's...Sorry but one can not make more precise...

6pdr the book you mention above, is..lord chelmsford and the zulu war, by gerald french 1939.edited by matthew gosset. 

Only Durnford, it seems, had some worries, we saw the result, he is so concerned about the reports received by Pulleine, he wanted to see for himself what it was ...

He gave a downright kick in a essain of killer bee who otherwise would have nothing requested to person before the January 23...

So is it not true that the Zulus wasn't keen on night attacks, due to evil omens ect?

Yes but that does not worry to RD ...

Especially the 23 ...  

There is no denying ,Durnford is truly trigger the attack on the camp ...

It is even more responsible for the disaster that LC ...

When we think that Durnford was just passing by the camp to join LC ...

Poor Pulleine

Don't agree, the attack was well underway before Durnford arrived on the field!

impi      

The attack WAS Underway well before Durnford arrived on the field??

No, Impi and Lester, the Zulu army took position, but there was certainly no ongoing attack or attacks planned that day ...

The facts are there, do not bother searching for any excuse to Durnford...

Cheers

Pascal

Now there's food for thought. Just getting into position ready to attack on the 23rd. so we could say they were harmlessly going about thier buiness, until Raw stumble upon them.

Impi Where was it ‘well underway’? Which coys/units were deployed/fighting on the British side before Durnford arrived? Where were they? Please provide primary source evidence for any remarks you make otherwise it will be disregarded.”   

Cheers

Pascal

Attack: a-tak, v.t. to begin to affect or act destructively on: the beginning of active operations...............etc
Not nessesarily a defended action.

uNdi and uDloko moving down the Western Valley to the ridge.
uNodwengu uNokhenke taking up position in the Manzimyama valley
iNgobamakhosi and uVe moving across from the Eastern end of Ngwebeni valley to start of Quabe valley
uMciju taking up forward position to South of Mabaso


Sources
Barker Natal Carbineers
JA Brickhill
Captain E Essex
Lt JRM Chard
Lt W Higginson
Lt Hillier
Lt C Pope
Lt Richard Wyatt Vause
Mehlokazulu ka Sihayo
Umtyolalo
HP Holt
Evelyn Wood

Authors
Bertram Mitford
I Knight
K Smith
R Lock and P Quantril

Impi: Fully agree.






















;

I'm inclined to think that the attack was underway prior to Durnford's arrival. There had been skirmishing that had pushed the mounted vedettes from their initial positions and the Zulu army was positioning itself for an attack on the camp. (An attack that would logically have been that day, it would not make sense to move your troops out of their bivouac areas into relatively open ground and tell them to sit on their backsides for another 24 hrs so close to enemy troops).
FH

FH Welcome to the forum and debate, I fully agree, it would have been a pretty stupid move and one thing Tshingwayo was not was stupid.

Cheers

 
Thanks Springbok9 looking forward to many interesting conversations/debates in the future!
FH

The facts are there, do not bother searching for any excuse to Durnford...

Rascal wrote:

The facts are there, do not bother searching for any excuse to Durnford...

What excuse would Durnford need for doing his duty anyway?  You confuse cause and effect.  The cause of the British defeat was the undetected proximity of an overwhelming enemy force. The effect was that it seemed to the surprised/beaten side that routine (if belated) patrols caused it...but from a rational perspective (which is what historians are supposed to maintain) that just doesn't pass the smell test.

Would behaving like ostriches that day have saved the British camp?  No, but it might have made the defeat more comprehensive.

The 22 was the Day of the New Moon ,and therefore unlucky ,so the army had not been prepared for a battle this day.

In fact by his mini-offensive operation, Colonel Durnford was neither more nor less triggers the Zulu attack, while the camp was not attacked or even threatened, as the Zulus would attack the next day,the 23 ...

And the 22 Zulu would not have attacked the camp, because without the disastrous initiatives of Durnford, the camp could have moved slowly and there have been no camp to attack to Isandhlwana the 22 ...

The Zulu have attacked the next day ,the 23 , it would be on their way by following Pulleine...

If Durnford had survived, he was responsible for the carnage and it was deserved ...

Durnford should not remain in the camp, but join LC, for the short time he remained in the camp, he had the time for committing the irreparable, what he did was to give a true kick in the anthill!

We are told Cetshwayo ordered his army not to attack before parlaying with the British. They did not parlay. He told them not to attack into British territory. They did so at Rorke's Drift. The Zulu were supposed to dread fighting at night. They also did that at Rorke's Drift. And of course the Zulu were not supposed to attack on the Day of the Dead Moon. But they did that too. When are you going to credit the men in the Zulu army with being autonomous human beings instead of "ants?"

Do you know that it is an image, say Durnford played with fire ...He, and not accidentally give a kick in a nest of African bees ...

For the impetuous side of some Zulu impi, as the umCIjo to Isandhwana or the inGhobamakhosi to Kambula, I agree, but this impetuous inclination is Still caused by the british , by accident, as in the two battles of the 22 or deliberately as in Kambula ...

Did they not attack Pearson's coloum on the 22nd Jan. the moon issue didn't deter them.

“Please note that I replied to impi’s statement that ‘the attack was well underway’. An attack is not the same thing as the manoeuvres you describe. You have all spoken of these manoeuvres as if they were the immediate precursor of an attack that day on the camp, a foregone conclusion. However you all know that there is no evidence in the slightest that the Zulu attack was going to take place that day. All the existing (Zulu) evidence states that it was planned for the next day.

I chose my words carefully to reply to impi’s post. Perhaps impi’s words should have been more carefully chosen.”

Rascal wrote:

The 22 was the Day of the New Moon ,and therefore unlucky ,so the army had not been prepared for a battle this day.

Don't get hung up on this. The battle of Inyezane was fought on the same day. Evidence that the Zulu's themselves were practical about fighting on this date. Also they had been prepared for battle before they reached the bivouac area.

The Zulu army was ritually strengthened at kwaNodwengu. Once this had been done, the army was despatched and ready to do battle. There would have been no further rituals performed for either individual regiments or the army as a whole. Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi

Initially I agree that they did not plan to attack on the 22nd but this plan was changed sometime overnight 21/22nd Jan and was not precipitated by Durnford or his arival in camp.

FH

Ps Rascal - Visited Vannes once many years ago, absolutely loved the place   I particularly remember an Irish bar on the waterfront!

forlornhope76 wrote:

Also they had been prepared for battle before they reached the bivouac area. The Zulu army was ritually strengthened at kwaNodwengu. Once this had been done, the army was despatched and ready to do battle. Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi

Great point.  I had forgotten about this ceremony.  They had prepared their weapons with smoke being wafted up the barrels etc...and Cetshwayo was sitting on the inkatha or whatever...

forlornhope76 and 6pdr of memory I can tell you that All the Existing (Zulu) states evidence That It WAS Planned for the next day, the 23 ...

Pascal read this thread!

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There was no decoy from the Zulu, the local Zulu army of Matanyas , was defending its region ...

And the Zulu royal army arrived and conducted his own campaign ...

This army here, certainly did not need a diversion of the Matanyas Men ...

Instead, it would have been better value for the Zulu royal army , that Lord Chelmsford rest in his camp with all the troops he brought in support of Dartnell , the Zulu victory would have been even more prestigious ...No ?

Zulu testimony confirms that the attack was scheduled to occur on the 23rd. No-one mentions a change of plans overnight on the 21st. There is nothing but surprise in the testimonies that the attack was going ahead on the 22nd.
The signature on Chelmsford's Instructions in indeed Chelmsford's. That he should warn of a Zulu night attack does not mean that the Zulus would have so attacked. Chelmsford had no special inside information on this.

Julian
The point is the attack did take place on the 22nd, the manouvering started probably not to long after Mehlokazulu arrived back from his scouting mission. Barkers testimony alone points to an early start from the Zulu.
So vey obviously there was a change of plan. Raws sighting of the impi did not precipitate a 22nd attack, at that point the right horn was deployed, the right centre was in the process of moving forward, the extreme left was moving out of the valley into Quabe.
Any other description of those manoeuvres other than a prelude to attack is not taking into account the reality of the situation. There is no testimony of a decision to attack because as far as Im aware all the existing statements are from rank and file foot soldiers. The only clue from a Zulu statement is from Mehlokazulu himself, he does mention the regiments being put into motion.
Conversly there is European testimony that at the time of sighting there were elements of the impi in motion.

Regards

well said   et toc   

But we do know!

"We need to know that Mehlokazulu was not himself privy to all the tactical information received by the Zulu battle commanders. He is also referring to the position of the amabutho by onset of darkness 21st January and not the very different situation that became clear on the early morning of the 22nd.
We slept that night at the above-mentioned place. In the morning Tsingwayo called me and said. ‘ Go with three other indunas and see what the English are doing.’ 

I called the indunas and started off at a good pace. We were all mounted. When we got to the range of hills looking on to Isandhlwana, we could see the English outposts [mounted men] quite close to us, and could also see the position of their camp. The outposts evidently saw us, for they commenced to move about, and there seemed to be a bustle in the camp, as some were inspanning the wagons, and others were getting in the oxen. We immediately went back, and I reported to our commander Tsingwayo, who said, ‘All right, we will see what they are going to do. I went away and had something to eat, as I had no food that morning. Presently I heard Tsingwayo give orders for the Tulwana and Ngyaza regiments to assemble. When they had done so he gave orders for the others to assemble and advance in the direction of the English camp. We were fired on first by the mounted men, who checked our advance for some little time.” 

I have posted this before in another thread but is relevant to this topic.

It shows that the Zulu's were advancing prior to being fired upon. So in my opinion the " New Moon statement" just doesn't stack up, backed up with Pearson coloum and RD being attack on the same day!

Obviously I was talking about the post of  julian   

Of course old chap.   

Hi All,
I think that it was really not the intention of the Zulus to attack Chelmsford on the 22nd.
This was confirmed when Mehlogozulu was questioned on this very matter post the battle and his reply was ;
"..the British had so fragmented themselves and lowered their defences at the camp that they presented themselves to us , fragmented, so as to enable an easy Zulu victory".
So, in short, the Zulus were smart enough to see the gap, and they were flexible enough to change their battle plan, taking their chances and in so doing securing a relatively easy victory.

regards,

barry

More weight to the fact, the Moon issue, was neither near or there! On that day the Zulu commander was smarter than the British commander! Albeit he wasn't at the camp!

I suppose it all comes down to the timings and sequence of events and how one may interpret Mehlokazulu's remarks to that sequence.  As I wrote before, in the topic little hand refers to, 'advancing' does not mean necessarily 'advancing to the attack' or 'attacking'; it may well mean 'moving into position' or 'manoeuvring' - the reference to the uThulwana and Udhloko in littlehand's quotation is just that (the reserve or loins getting into the appropriate place). The translation of Mehlokazulu's testimony also has to be compared with other Zulus' accounts to see if they correlate (and they don't).

With regard to the attack being scheduled for the 22nd or 23rd, an impartial observer cannot ignore the Zulu testimony (100% of it) that it was scheduled for the 23rd no matter how convincing arguments may be, tactically, logistically, or otherwise, for its being scheduled for the 22nd. The reasons for that testimony are irrelevant (be they Cetshwayo's instructions, 'dead moons', or whatever), the point is their consistency.

While, I'm here and while I can (because life is a bit full at the moment and I may not get another chance) may I wish you all (and I mean all) a very Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.

Julian Whybra wrote:

I suppose it all comes down to the timings and sequence of events and how one may interpret Mehlokazulu's remarks to that sequence.  As I wrote before, in the topic little hand refers to, 'advancing' does not mean necessarily 'advancing to the attack' or 'attacking'; it may well mean 'moving into position' or 'manoeuvring' - the reference to the uThulwana and Udhloko in littlehand's quotation is just that (the reserve or loins getting into the appropriate place). The translation of Mehlokazulu's testimony also has to be compared with other Zulus' accounts to see if they correlate (and they don't).

With regard to the attack being scheduled for the 22nd or 23rd, an impartial observer cannot ignore the Zulu testimony (100% of it) that it was scheduled for the 23rd no matter how convincing arguments may be, tactically, logistically, or otherwise, for its being scheduled for the 22nd.  The reasons for that testimony are irrelevant (be they Cetshwayo's instructions, 'dead moons', or whatever), the point is their consistency.

While, I'm here and while I can (because life is a bit full at the moment and I may not get another chance) may I wish you all (and I mean all) a very Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.

Can't see why they would take the risk, of advancing towards the camp in day light to get into position for attack that was planned for the 23rd Jan. 20.000 + Zulus successfully made it to a valley undetected only to move into position on the 22nd insight of the British. Doesn't make sense.

Happy Christmas and New Year to you Julian.

Well, there's a lot that doesn't make sense on 22nd Jan.  One of the joys of Isandhlwana and the reasons behind this website is that there are no easy answers.

I don't want to repeat things said on another thread which dealt with this topic recently but some sources for you for comparison with Mehlokazulu's account:
Uguku (Colenso and Durnford p. 345); Mehlokazulu (RE Journal a/c); Umbonambi warrior (Mitford p. 89).
In addition it is necessary to look at the accounts from warriors in the regiments named by Mehlokazulu as having been ordered to advance to see exactly what they were doing, viz. uThulwana warrior (Mitford) and uDhloko warrior (Mitford).

Mehlokazulu said that Ntshingwayo ordered the uThulwane and uDhloko to advance (i.e. move forward); where was not stated.  Is it likely that Ntshingwayo ordered just two (out of thirteen regiments) to ATTACK?  The attack order would have been a simultaneous one.  Mehlokazulu was not involved in any of these movement orders - he was not in one of the involved regiments and he was not a party to the decision-making or its reasoning.
There is not one Zulu account that states it was intended to attack on the 22nd - in fact on the other hand there are several that go out of their way to point out that it was scheduled for the 23rd.  Historical validity has to be evidenced otherwise it has no foundation.  The evidence without exception all points only one way - which is why Lock and Quantrill have taken so much stick over their theory and their refusal to countenance the inclusion of Zulu testimony in its formulation (incomprehensible in my opinion).

All good historians take on board new evidence and I am always prepared to consider the relevance of new material and to change my mind as a result but L&Q have nothing of this sort. It's speculation but it's not history.

As for Ntshingwayo being "smarter than the British" I must quote springbok from another thread when he wrote:
"What on earth was so good about Ntshingwayo?  He nearly gets discovered on 6 separate occasions. Allows his regiments to go walk about all over the plateau on the morning of the 22nd (that directly leads to the battle.)  Then loses control of his whole army and lets the battle start.  And he can't change tactics fast enough to avoid loosing 20 to 25% of his men."
I might add that he failed to ensure the encircling ring was closed before charging home allowing some 300+ British plus allies to break out and then lost control of his reserve such that they went off on their own initative to attack RD (disastrously).

Well, we're not going to agree on this, I know, and we must agree to disagree as the safest option under the circumstances.

Although we don't know who the deserter was, his statement clearly shows there was an awful lot of confusion. to the extend where formations changed. was the Order give, or did the regiments just attack out of anger!!! ???

"The following account is of great interest as having been given by a Zulu deserter:—

"The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps about 3000 strong, the Nokenke 2000, the Nkobamakosi, including the Uve, 5000 strong, the Umcityu 4000 strong, the Nodwengu 2000 strong, the Umbonambi 3000, and the Udkloko 1000—a total of 20,000 men in all—after an address from the king left the Nodwengu military kraal on January 17th, and proceeded on their march towards Rorke's Drift. On the 20th they halted for the night close by the Isipezi hill, and on the 21st, keeping to the eastward, they occupied a valley running north and south under the spurs of the Ngutu hill, which concealed that of Isandhlwana, distant about four miles nearly due west. The order of encampment was—on the right, the Nodwengu, Nokenke and Umcityu; in the centre, the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi; on the left, the Ulundi and Udkloko corps. On the morning of the 22nd there was no intention of making an attack on account of some superstition as to the state of the moon, and they were sitting down resting when firing was heard by the Zulus on the right. This was at first supposed by them to be an attack on the centre, but a[55] move being made in that direction this proved not to be the case; and it was soon found out that this was the whites engaged with Matyana's people some ten miles off to the left front. Just after the Zulus had resumed their position, and again sat down, a herd of cattle came past their line driven down by some of their scouts from the right. Just when these were opposite the Umcityu regiment a body of mounted men on the hill to the west were seen galloping and evidently trying to cut them off. When several hundred yards off, seeing the Umcityu, they dismounted, fired a volley, and retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged. This example was followed by the Nokenke and Nodwengu on the right, as well as by the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi in the centre, whilst the Undi and Udkloko formed a circle—as is customary with the Zulus when a force is about to engage—and remained in their position. With these were the two chief officers Mavamingwana and Tyugwayo, who after a short pause led away these centre troops in a north-westerly direction, and keeping to the north of the Isandhlwana performed a turning movement, unseen by the English through the nature of the ground. Thus the original Zulu left became the extreme right, the right the centre, and the centre the left. The two regiments forming the latter—the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi—made a turning movement along the front of the camp to the English right, but became engaged before they could complete it. The Uve battalion of the Nkobamakosi had to retire till reinforced; and the Umbonambi suffered heavily from the artillery fire. Meanwhile the Zulu centre, consisting of the Umcityu (left centre) and Nokenke and Nodwengu (higher up on the right) under the hill, were making a direct attack on the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely from both artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire alone; while the Nodwengu suffered least. When the camp was carried the regiments became all mixed up together; some pursued the fugitives to the Buffalo; the remainder plundered the camp: but the Undi and Udkloko made the best of their way to Rorke's Drift, in order to plunder the post there."

24th wrote:

was the Order give, or did the regiments just attack out of anger!!! ???

Good point. We know the original story, where the Zulu rose up and attack Raw and company when fired upon! Was it at this point the Zulu commanders lost control. Not an easy task to stop a Zulu Impi once on the move. Perhaps it was the Zulu regiments that cocked it up for the commanders if they had intended on attacking on the 23rd. ?

Another Road to go down!!!

How do you explain the reports coming in from 05:30 onwards regarding mass Zulu movements around the camp of Isandlwana.

Forgot about that!   

Rascal wrote:

All the Existing (Zulu) states evidence That It WAS Planned for the next day, the 23 ...

Pascal, I don't dispute that. But there's a famous expression in English that you are probably well familiar with: The best plan seldom survives first contact with the enemy. The army was doctored before they left Cetshwayo's capital. That's a fact too.

littlehand wrote:

How do you explain the reports coming in from 05:30 onwards regarding mass Zulu movements around the camp of Isandlwana.

This is what convinces me that there was a change in plan and the attack originally planned for the 23rd was (for whatever reason) brought forward to the 22nd. You simply do not manouver your troops around like the Zulu's are reported to have done so close to the enemy - it's not as if they didn't know the British were there.

FH

Hi 6pdr.
I'm fairly certain only some of the zulu regiments were '' doctored '' before leaving the capital , that's another reason why the attack , as Julian has stated , was to take place on the 23rd , there is no zulu testimony that I've read , that states the intention was to attack on the 22nd . Ian Knight , among others , mentions that not all the rituals had been conducted on the zulus who were to fight at Isandlwana .
Cheers 90th.