Exactly what was Chelmsford guilty of?

Frederic

Impenetrable!

Steve

Steve, i know perfectifly that Frank and you are not anti-Glyn.
I wrote anti-Glyn between " " with the mention "i know it's not really the case".
it was a freedom (awkward) of French-English translation.

Gary, I answer to your question?

Sorry...

Frederic

I am pulling your "jambe" my friend.
No apology required.

Steve

Steve,
Thank you very much.

in other words to be sure to have been well understood: Frank and you have partially exempt Chelmsford of its responsibility by attributing mistakes on Glyn's shoulders. Therefore, I clumsily used the term "anti-Glyn".

Cheers.

rusteze wrote:

Hi Frederic

The problem with assessing Glyn is that he is a shadowy figure during this first invasion. It is inevitable that we largely rely on Clery's comments, but I agree with you that we need to be careful because of Clery's own predilections. However, what little we know of Glyn during those few days seems to me to fit Clery's description. I think in my first post on this aspect of Chelmsford's culpability I said that Glyn's actions (or more accurately inactions) contributed to the disaster. In no way am I anti-Glyn, what I am saying is that he had a flaw. Neither am I saying that his inaction partially exonerates Chelmsford - but I do believe that an active input from him might have made things better.

Steve

Steve,

You wrote:
Turning to Isandlwana, my inclination is to think that Chelmsford made a mistake in not doing something to fortify. (....) I do however believe that the whole thing is exacerbated by the lack of initiative shown by Glyn, who recognised the need to protect the camp better but did did not feel able to assert himself. Chelmsford guilty, but extenuating circumstances.

Frank wrote:
Still believe that Glyn should have grown a pair. (...) I have to lay a solid piece of the blame with Glyn in this instance. So a divided error would be my vote.
Cheers

Yes, a divided error in not better protecting the camp, but that does not mean equally divided. Neither does it absolve Chelmsford for other poor judgements such as dividing the force.

Steve

90th see below

ymob wrote:

Bonjour,

Most of the accusations in this threat against the character of GLYN are based on letters from CLERY.
So the question: CLERY, a reliable witness?
I have not the answer to this question, but I oberve about CLERY's character these comments:
-From the editor (Daphne CHILD) of "Zululand at war" (I.E: after the study of his letters): "Vain, able, critical of friend and foe, egostistical and amusing";

-From J.F. MAURICE: "Tendancy to belittle the services of good men...he is the last man I should rely on to say a good word of me behind my back".

First point: CLERY's comments about others men don't seem to be the "divine scriptures".
2nd  point: It would have been maybe useful to study the behavior of GLYN during the war of 1877-1878: to confirm or refute the adjective lethargic and other pleasantries revealed by the always well-intentioned  CLERY.

Effectively it's not a threat about the "good guys and bad guys" but it's the "anti-Glyn" members (I.E: I know it is not really the case) who used the first arguments on GLYN's character to exonerate partially CHELMSFORD's responsability.

Just a thought.



Cheers

rusteze wrote:

Yes, a divided error in not better protecting the camp, but that does not mean equally divided. Neither does it absolve Chelmsford for other poor judgements such as dividing the force.

Steve

When and if this thread reaches its conclusion, do you think that we could have a thread on the topic of what LC could/should have done, it would be interesting to see how other people would have planned the campaign with the resources and intelligence that LC had at the time. (Hindsight is a wonderful thing) There are plenty of ex-military men on here, it could be an interesting subject.

Bonsoir à tous,

About GLYN's character:

From General Sir Arthur T. Cunynghame: "I greatly apprecied the zeal and intelligence of Colonel Glyn who I directed to take command in the Transkei, and of all his officers" (source: "My command in S.A., 1874-1878" p.339 /you can read it for free on archive.org)

Cheers.

Frédéric

Frederic

Interesting. Cunyngham was replaced by Thesiger after Frere dismissed the Cape Government (see Zulu Rising chapter 9). So Glyn gets a new boss.

Steve

Glyn in action.

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Why are we looking into the back ground of Col Glyn. Is this relevant to Isandlwana ?

rusteze wrote:

Frederic

Interesting. Cunyngham was replaced by Thesiger after Frere dismissed the Cape Government (see Zulu Rising chapter 9). So Glyn gets a new boss.

Steve

Hi Steve,
Actually, as you say, just interesting, nothing else.
There is also an interesting comment about Pulleine ( p. 339) for later...
Bonjour Les,
I have read all the actions of Glyn in the Cunyngham's book.
But Cunyngham's narrative looks like for me as an official report...So in my humble opinion not relevant. Same conclusion for Keith Smith's book on this war ( but i don't yet finish to read it)
cheers

My response to the charge that Glyn was lethargic and lazy..
all that i have read about him paints him as a competent
and experienced senior officer, one who Chelmsford seemed
fit to promote to brigadier.if one reads and then really absorbs
Clery's brilliant reply to Chelmsford's attempt to ' fit up ' Glyn,
it is clearly understood just how little of Glyn's command was
left to him when his lordship attached himself to the central
column. Glyn, through Clery, let Chelmsford know just how much
he was aware of what had transpired and what game his lordship
was attempting, in order for the cover up to flourish..Glyn was
having none of it, chelmsford had no choice but to agree with Glyn's
report..and then sign it off as correct.

Glyn had his chance at the COE, but he colaborated Clery's report!

Possible...
But, I am not certain that his psychological state allowed him for the reasons given by Xhosa.

In October 1877, when they were garrison on the Cap Frontier, The high Commissioner thought them [1/24th] “a seasoned battalion under an excellent, steady, sensible commander, Colonel Glyn, and with very good young officers” (quoted in “Hill of the Sphinx” p.7)

What impressed observers about the 1/24th of Glyn during the war of the cape frontier was their professionalism: General Cunyngham, declared about this battalion: “there was no duty whatever which the Regiment could not be found equal to”. (“My command in S.A.” p.338)
Just a though ( I am not sure of the answer): which is to be commended for the quality of this battalion, Glyn? (in theory and "in practice", or only in theory)
Cheers
Frédéric

ymob wrote:

Possible...
But, I am not certain that his psychological state allowed him for the reasons given by Xhosa.

You can't keep falling back on psychological problems, the same excuse was used for Durnford. Stop making excuses, andwasting time looking at previous wars individuals took part in. If Glyn had such a wonderful reputation in prior wars, what happened to him during the Zulu War. Like Durnford, Glyn was the wrong person for the job. Perhaps they both had such stroke and didn't realise.

xhosa2000 wrote:

all that i have read about him paints him as a competent
and experienced senior officer, one who Chelmsford seemed
fit to promote to brigadier.
 

Bonsoir Xhosa,
What is your source for this (one who CHELMSFORD seemed fit to promote to Brigadier)?
I only found: "With the outbreak of the 9th Cape Frontier War" in 1877 the 1/24th was ordered to the Transkei, and Glyn appointed commander, wih the rank of Colonel of the staff and brevet brigadier general" [so before the arrival of Chelmsford in S.A.]
Cheers.
Frédéric

Mr Greaves wrote:

ymob wrote:

Possible...
But, I am not certain that his psychological state allowed him for the reasons given by Xhosa.

You can't keep falling back on psychological problems, the same excuse was used for Durnford. Stop making excuses, andwasting time looking at previous wars individuals took part in. If Glyn had such a wonderful reputation in prior wars, what happened to him during the Zulu War. Like Durnford, Glyn was the wrong person for the job. Perhaps they both had such  stroke and didn't realise.

Interesting question: "If Glyn had such a wonderful reputation in prior wars, what happened to him during the Zulu war?"
Personnally; i don't yet know, if GLYN was a wonderful soldier before the zulu war.
For the rest, I leave you to your conclusions.
Cheers

I acknowledge copywrite of the above image, can't recall who
has it at the moment.


You can't keep falling back on psychological problems, the same excuse was used for Durnford. Stop making excuses, andwasting time looking at previous wars individuals took part in. If Glyn had such a wonderful reputation in prior wars, what happened to him during the Zulu War. Like Durnford, Glyn was the wrong person for the job. Perhaps they both had such stroke and didn't realise. said mr greaves...Oh dear, please study more, its all out there!. you only have to look.

That image is taken from an Adrian Greaves book.

Correct Dave, Isandhlwana by Adrian Greaves 2001..been a long
time since iv'e looked through that.

Xhosa,
Thank you.
Cheers

I've seen that picture of Glyn in other books from memory .
90th

Merci Frederic. Hiya Gary..yeah mate it has been in a few,
my concern about the copywrite is that the image is mounted..in
the Greaves book it is just laid in amongst the text, so one of our
esteemed collectors might give me a nudge.

Gentlemen: a new member jumping in the with my comments. I have read all posts with interest - am in awe with everyone's knowledge and opinions. Have read several books re: Isandlwana - Greaves, Morris, Knight (just go my copy of Zulu Rising). I really enjoyed xhosa's posts re: LCs report and Glyn's response written by Clery - they provide insights to my study that I would otherwise have no access. For what it is worth, I believe LC must shoulder most responsibility for the disaster.

P.S. - Posting from Indiana, USA where it is 2degrees cold.

brillo1971

Welcome Brillo and thank you for posting. I hope you enjoy the forum. I think many of us would agree that LC should shoulder most responsibility. But what for exactly and who else might also be in the frame?
Of the books you listed i think you may find Zulu Rising offers the most insight. Let us know what you think. Not so warm here in Hampshire Uk either, about 3 degrees.

Best wishes
Steve

Thanks Steve:
My reasons are not new: LC'S disregard for Zulu fighting fervor to repel invaders; lack of clear and concise orders; his splitting of force. Must say I was swayed a little with the debate re: Glyn's lack of command decisions of his regiment in issue of defensive lagaaring of the camp particular when force was split. There is a lot a do not understand and hate to bring up issues that I am sure have been discussed and re-discussed many times on the forum. It has always struck me as odd that the offensive fighting ability of the NNC levies was taken for granted as being capable.

Maybe this isn't the place for this question but here I go: as I said earlier I have read several but am still confused - when Curling's artillery retired back to camp, Zulu warriors were already in the camp, where did they come from - were they down from the saddle area, from the rear of the camp, the main chest ???

Thanks in advance for clarification.

Welcome Brillo1970
The Zulus that were in the camp when the RA attempted to flee the battlefield were the right horn , which had worked its way behind Isandlwana , Mostyn & Cavaye were sent up to the extreme left of the Nqutu Ridge , these two companies opened fire at these Zulus from about 800 yds away , as the Zulus made their way from right to left to get behind Isandlwana and then cut the road to Rorke's Drift . Hope this helps ? .
Cheers 90th

I also echo Steve and Gary! Brillo1979, welcome mate..you seem to have a handle on this by the
questions you pose.. The NNC's role certainly bears more scrutiny..did they desert the firing line?.
opening a gap for the Zulu to pour through? were they even on the firing line?. the AZW is a great
subject to get your teeth into, lots of opinions and counter opinions..good luck. xhosa

Getting back to the original question! " Exactly what was Chelmsford guilty of?" Not really seeing anything other than the norm!!!!!

Well we have all been here before, have we not!. Chelmsford's culpability
is there for all to see!..for those who have eyes to see!. it is said that
there are two camps on this forum, lets start with the obvious.. do we
accept that Chelmsford aided and abetted Bartle-Frere. i have no doubt in
my mind that he did..whether or not he was in thrall to the machinations of
his superior, the older, wiser Frere..it is well known and fact that even before
the end of the 9th war the conquest of Zululand was next on the agenda..but
we know that Chelmsford's conniving role was overlooked and Frere took the
brunt of the political fallout. (rightly).

So we turn to his lordships performance during the actual campaign..he at
first intended to invade with five columns but soon realized that this would
be impossible given the logistical nightmare that unfolded even before a british
soldier set foot in Zululand.. the five became three columns..the first split
of his forces.. He proceeds to invade Zululand and after the initial skirmish
at Sihayo's homestead he selects the camp at Isandhlwana, Dartnell unnerved
by Ntshingwayo's brilliant ruse in lighting hundreds of campfire's, promptly
panic's with the result that Chelmsford divides his force again.. i am as all will
realize paraphrasing the events we all know to well. but what i cant understand
and i mean i really struggle with this. is why did Chelmsford if he expected to
have the whole Zulu army on him (and he did expect it).. leave the ammunition
back at the camp?. i have puzzled this for many years and no one has come up
with a satisfactory explanation. it would have taken several hours to get that
fully laden wagon back to Chelmsford.. so if he had indeed come up against the
main Zulu army, what would of happened?..how quickly would his command
have been wiped out before the reserve ammunition reached him! remember
they had seventy rounds per man plus their personal reserve of thirty..100
round's, would that have been enough to defeat the Zulu army. because we know
that on the march back to relieve Isandhlwana as they passed the Undi they were
so low on ammunition that they dared not risk an engagement.

I would invite anybody who thinks Chelmsford was unfairly maligned and indeed
thinks he was a good general to step up to the plate and say why!.

" I really struggle with this. is why did Chelmsford if he expected to
have the whole Zulu army on him (and he did expect it).. leave the ammunition.

Now that is a very good question!

The simplest explanation is it would've slowed him down . The Ammo wagons couldn't have kept up in the terrain , and LC wanted to be more mobile . As for you saying LC expected to have the whole Zulu army come down on him I find a little hard to follow , LC didn't think for a moment the camp would be attacked , and his main worry was getting the Zulu's to in fact confront him and his column ! .
90th

The question mark is not the ammunition. Chelmsford does not believe he is facing the entire Zulu army, he believes he is facing Matshana's men (which is correct). He takes with him 6 companies of the 2/24th who are carrying about 35,000 rounds between them. It was entirely reasonable to have his reserve ammunition follow and not slow him down. He would not have reached Dartnell in time if he had taken it. His error, in my view, is taking far more troops than he needs to re-inforce Dartnell (who later says he asked for two companies). Chelmsford is totally unaware that the main Zulu army lies way off on his left flank and he would continue to be ignorant of it for many hours yet.

Steve

The simplest explanation is it would've slowed him down . The Ammo wagons couldn't have kept up in the terrain , and LC wanted to be more mobile . As for you saying LC expected to have the whole Zulu army come down on him I find a little hard to follow , LC didn't think for a moment the camp would be attacked , and his main worry was getting the Zulu's to in fact confront him and his column ! .
90th says 90th..

Well only a fool would not expect to be attacked! you invade a country..we have had friendly relations with for over forty years..connive to invade and subjugate same country with everybody
seemingly in the know...the military knew it was invading..the colonists knew, the boers knew, and
more importantly the zulu knew..Chelmsford had been warned the Zulu were an entirely different
proposition from anything he had faced before, he had advise from the best people who knew from
bitter experience the fighting prowess of the Zulu. he released pamphlets instructing that all steps
must be taken to laager at each stop!. advice he totally ignored..why would'nt Chelmsford in splitting his force to run to Dartnells aid, who had advertised the presence of a major force to his
front..NOT be expecting at the very least a sizeable portion of the enemy, otherwise why would he
take such numbers with him..the ammo could with an escort have followed him at its own pace and at least be at hand when and IF needed..the fact that is was not is besides the point..the camp was not expected to be attacked! oh really, Ntshingwayo thought differently as it turned out..
Chelmsford was a vacillating incompetent as events proved when taking his performance in the round.." i cant understand it, i left over a thousand men there". i dont take seriously the comment that he did not take the ammunition because it would have ' slowed him down '..everything on that campaign was slow, building roads on the march, the lack of even adequate maps all conspired to slow that lumbering Juggernaut which was the central column. Chelmsford was in effect operating
blind at all times..the Zulu had their eyes very much wide open. we all know the result..one from
which Chelmsford never fully recovered from. just my opinion's..we all have them.

Crossed post with you there Steve. yours goes to show my point, Chelmsford was operating
blindly, the intelligence on the british side was woeful at best, he did not know what was to
his front or for that matter anywhere else as it turned out.

Les

You are indeed entitled to your view and to label Chelmsford as a "fool" and a "vacillating incompetent". I don't think he was either of those things, but he did make errors which led to disaster. I think Frank began this thread to try and get behind the labels and pin down exactly what errors can be laid at Chelmsford's door in a balanced way. The point of my last post was to say that leaving his reserve ammunition to follow him to Dartnell's aid was not an error. I stick by that. I also raised the question of why he took such a large force with him (which left Isandhlwana denuded of adequate numbers). I think looking at his experience in 1878 may help us with that. Likewise, your right to raise the question of reconnaissance and intelligence, but some things he could not change - like the state of the roads and the available maps. In my view it gives a very false picture to damn him out of hand for everything he did. We have already shown in this thread that he made a pretty good fist of planning for the defence of Natal. In my view we have also pointed to evidence that Frere was the major player in planning to subjugate Zululand and Chelmsford played a subordinate role. Also in my view, we have raised legitimate concerns about Glyn's lost opportunities to have an impact. I have learnt some new things in pursuing some of those topics which has, so far, made the thread worthwhile for me. Lets hope, on today of all days, it can continue.

Steve

Perhaps not a very good question! Thanks 90th your comment makes sense.

90th wrote:

The simplest explanation is it would've slowed him down . The Ammo wagons couldn't have kept up in the terrain , and LC wanted to be more mobile . As for you saying LC expected to have the whole Zulu army come down on him I find a little hard to follow , LC didn't think for a moment the camp would be attacked , and his main worry was getting the Zulu's to in fact confront him and his column ! .
90th

Thanks for that Steve, good response.. yes i do label Chelmsford an incompetent
fool..but with the caveat..pre and 1st invasion..after that he was ever conscious
of salvaging his reputation. i know this thread was to encourage debate and that
Chelmsford bashing could be kept to a minimum in order for the pro Chelmsford
view be properly aired, but that of course has never materialized..all the material
i have read over many years reach the same conclusion!. and the verdict on him
was weighed and measured in only a few months after Isandhlwana..he was found
wanting..it really is to very easy to mass and then present the findings of just
about every reputable historian on the AZW, they all say the same.. just a snippet
from one of them.

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I suppose what I am saying is this. If the incompetent fool of January becomes the successful all conquering General of July the labels are not helping us very much. The perennial problem we have, and have always had, is that the machinations of the so called Court of Inquiry and the consequential "lets blame Durnford" episode leads us to either brand Chelmsford as the devil incarnate or elevate him to sainthood. That label, one or the other, then gets applied to his every move. This thread looks like it will allow us to explore some of the background in an interesting way providing we can suspend judgement a little while we do it. If all the reputable authors have got there already we might as well just read the books and save our breath mightn't we?

Steve

No worries Littlehand , LC virtually answers the question himself by saying '' I left a 1,000 men here '' his overconfidence was what contributed to the fact the camp was lost , he also obviously didn't think he was going to encounter the whole Zulu army as he would've some how made some sort of provision for the Reserve ammo , the terrain is bad out that way , it would've been far worse in 1879 , simply the Ammo wagons couldn't have kept up , I think the Guns had a difficult time as well , LC's ammo wagons would've been hard to find , its not like they could follow a road etc . If they couldn't find the Zulu army how was he going to keep track of the ammo wagons ! LOL .
90th

I suppose what I am saying is this. If the incompetent fool of January becomes the successful all conquering General of July again cynical of me, i know but all conquering is a
bit of a stretch..but i agree with the gist..yes we must keep talking.


If they couldn't find the Zulu army how was he going to keep track of the ammo wagons ! LOL . says the 90th..well the Zulu certainly found him.

Open question re LC taking 6 coy to the field to support Dartnell.  How strung out would a force this size be exposed to an attach and therefore how vulnerable was LC until he met up with Dartnell and the NNC.

Brillo1970.
If LC and his force ran into the Zulu army I hasten to say it would've been over very quickly ! . In other words it wouldn't have been much fun being part of LC's command ! . They were indeed spread out , the Artillery from memory had to go looking for a different route than what the infantry took , due to the lay of the land , it was very tough going for those with the Artillery etc . Don't forget there were over a 1,000 killed back at the camp , they were much less in number with LC ! . It would've been an impossibility for LC and his mento hold of any attacking force of any reasonable size .
90th

I thought when reports were coming from Dartnell, it was thought they had found the main army. It is said that Dartnell was going to attack anyway with or with out reinforcements. If a small force like Dartnell's was going to attack, the surly the thoughts must have been not that serious or not serious enough to take half the force from Isandlwana. Don't think LC & Glyn would have take half the force if they didn't think they was going against the main Zulu army.