Durnford's Level of Culpability

The tents being struck was a visible sign of alarm, nothing whatsoever to do with moving up to join Chelmsford. Prior the Zulu assault on Khambula Wood ordered the tents to struck, not that he could rely on any possible reinforcements.

JY

Hi Sime
Yes you can see the Tents and the camp from where Milne was , I've been up there a few times , I know Kate took her c.1879 Telescope on at least one occasion so we could see basically what Milne saw . One needs to remember that from memory the order to pack up the camp was only for the equipage etc that belonged to the companies out with Chelmsford ? . There are several reports of those out with LC hearing the dull thud of Artillery , so much so that Harness turned his guns around and was heading back to Isandlwana , before , I think Gosset rode up and asked what he was doing , he was told by Gosset (?) to turn back around and catch up with LC's force , let's not forget Maori Hamilton Brown had front row seats witnessing the attack unfold , so much so from memory he states he sent 5 messages to LC , LC from memory said he saw one or none ? , so LC obviously telling Porkies ( Lies ) or the messenger couldn't locate LC , or if indeed he handed them to someone else... they also having the same problem !, LC and his force were spread out like Brown's cows , if they were attacked they would've been chopped quite quickly ! . Never ever heard the non striking of the Tents was any type of defence for LC . As JY mentioned Wood did order the Tents struck at Kambula .
90th

Gary

Now you mention it, I had read about Harness etc but I have trouble remembering what I had for tea yesterday....!

If Lord C sent an order back to basically break the 2nd/24th camp and also sent back GBH & his units to help, what were his intentions for the remainder of the 'garrison'?

He'd apparently selected his next camp site (Manengi Gorge?)

He must have wanted the remainder to follow on - unless he wanted a staging post for wagons coming from RD - it couldn't have been less than a days travel from RD to Isandlwana (by ox cart).

What were Lord Cs plans for resupply or didn't he expect the war to last that long?

Cheers

Sime (the amnesiac)

Once on the Mangeni, LC's focus had already shifted to that spot. To him, he was already at his HQ. It was Pulleine's force, left behind, that should come up and join him at the new campsite.
Remember Pulleine's 12.15-ish message - 'Cannot move camp at present'.

Morning Gary
Looks like your team are going through, glad about that, to much history there for them to miss the cut.
Interesting comment above to Simon: "One needs to remember that from memory the order to pack up the camp was only for the equipage etc that belonged to the companies out with Chelmsford ? "
I would be interested to know the source for the limited move.
As I recall the message delivered by Gardner was "to pack up the camps (plural) and come with all speed leaving a sufficient guard behind to protect such as could not be moved without delay"

Cheers mate

Sime
That's my interpretation too.

Gary is right

"I was sent back to Lt.Col. Pulleine with orders to bring on the tents and rations of the men out leaving the standing camp under Lt. Col Pulleine who was at once to entrench it"
Captain Alan Gardner Utrecht 23rd January 1879

and
".. and that the camp of the force out was to be struck and sent out immediatly, also rations and forage for about seven days."
Captain Alan Gardner. Court of enquiry

and
..rode back to Isandula camp with the order to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine to send on the camp equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain at present and entrench it"
Captain Alan Gardner. Despatch 9th February

Kate

Brickhill has a different version
"to pack up the camps (plural) and come with all speed leaving a sufficient guard behind to protect such as could not be moved without delay"

Personally I'd be more inclined to believe the words of the man who actually delivered the message. Especially as he repeats it in several different accounts and letters.
Kate

So, Lord Cs splitting of the Column was supposed to be a longer arrangement than just a case of HBP catching up later in the day?

One could argue that splitting your forces before knowing the location of the enemy, was a risk short-term but longer?

So was Isandlwana supposed to be a staging post?

Cheers

Sime

Hamilton Browne also throws his hat into the ring: " Colonel Crealock came to me and said, Commandant Browne, I want you to return at once to the camp and assist Colonel Pulleine to strike camp and come on here."

Frank.....can you believe the words of GBH....a mere colonial.....who ate babies.....,

Kate is quite right - Gardner repeats the same phrase in more than one of his letters. It is curious in that it doesn't chime with Pulleine's remark 'Cannot move camp at present'.
I need to have a look at Harford, Harness and other accounts to see what they say.

Pulleine seems to have been under the impression the camp should be moved, his message was," Heavy firing to left of camp. Cannot move Camp at present."

Cant locate at present but didnt Lonsdale use moving HIS camp as an excuse to return to camp?

I thought Lonsdale had a touch of the sun or some concussion? Or was that someone else

My point being Sime/Julian that there is no military sense in splitting the camp. Consider that the force left behind to guard, just the 1/st 24th would have been quite minor, a number of companies would have had to be deployed to guard the column moving to Mangane. Popes would not have been sufficient. The balance of 1/24th left would have been in a precarious position. So Chelmsford would quite possibly be opening two additional battle fronts, on the plain with a strung out column and against a small defence force at iSandlwana.
Simon cant undestand your dislike of New Zealand baby eaters.
So there are a number of accounts that disagree with the most Godly Captain of Hussars.  

Frank, he's actually one of my heroes.....

Im sure he played against Ireland the other night.

Harkness merely says that Chelmsford asked for equiptment to be sent on. So neither here nor there. I cant find anything from Harford.

The despatch was given to Alan by Clery who read the message over with him before he set off to ensure he knew the contents should the original note become lost.
The continuity that Alan shows throughout his accounts is proof that  he had not forgotten its content.
His earliest account written from Utrecht on the 23rd when the events were still fresh in his memory and before he was influenced by anyone else is proof of this.

By the by I don't defend Alan's actions as some think on this forum through some blind, misplaced, hero worship.
As a man he was no saint by any stretch of the imagination and I should know this having studied his life for the last 7 years and written his biography, but his actions and the evidence he leaves us about his time in SA about the Zulu War is out there for all to see and MUST be considered when looking at the battle of iSandlwana and the defence of Rorke's Drift.

Which takes us nicely back to the title of this thread, Durnford's culpability and who was to blame.
Kate

Brickhill also makes mention of the message. It's move the whole camp except a guard to protect what cannot be moved at once.

OK, so HBP sends the 2nd Battalion kit on to Lord C - with GBHs NNIC (now I have often wondered why they were sent back to help - maybe to provide an escort for kit if only Popes company, were to come on)

The wagons at Isandlwana were supposed to be heading back to RD.

How effective would the entrenching of the camp been, given size of the garrison left behind (5 companies).

They could have undoubtedly have made defences for themselves but what about any future wagon convoys.

Is there any mention of what the cavalry and artillery was to do - stay or move on?

Cheers

Harness will answer re the RA - I have to go out.

Can someone remind me of what AWDs orders were?

To move to Isandlwana (and he went off of his own accord chasing Zulus) or was it to catch up with Lord C (but he got excited on the way)

Or are the actual orders part of the papers with may or may not have been found on his body?

Sime a large contingent of wagons were scheduled to head back to RD but I think there were sufficient Regimental waggons available but that amount strung out on the track would have been quite a lengthy column. Harkness had enough trouble just moving a couple of guns so I would imagine the numbers required to move the 2/24th would be considerable, quite possibly denuding the 1/24th in camp.

The wagons were not due to go back to RD.
Chelmsford countermanded the order  before he left on the morning of the 22nd.
Kate

SRB
Harness says that the order was only for 7 days' supplies to be sent out and that smith said he would go back to camp to ensure they were sent out.
The Narrative says that the men out with Chelmsford were to move to the new camp and that the message back to camp was for tents, equipage, etc., to be sent out (without specifying anything else).

Kate
Where did you see that LC had countermanded the order re the waggons?
Smith-Dorrien wrote that "45 empty waggons stood in the camp with the oxen in. It was a convoy which I was to have taken to Rork'es Drift for supplies early in the morning, but which was stopped until the enemy should be driven off."
Might it not simply have been Pulleine that countermanded it with the proviso as written by S-D?

Clery 9th February 1879 to Lord Chelmsford, early on the morning of the 22nd:-

"I mentioned to him that the empty wagons were, according to his orders, to start at daybreak for Rorke's Drift, which would reduce the force left in camp by hte escort required by the wagons. The General then directed that these wagons should not go back that day."

John Young wrote:

The tents being struck was a visible sign of alarm, nothing whatsoever to do with moving up to join Chelmsford.  Prior the Zulu assault on Khambula Wood ordered the tents to struck, not that he could rely on any possible reinforcements.

JY

Hi John hope your well

Concerning the timing of Milne I may be wrong but he was sent up with his telescope to view the camp when Chelmsford got the message from Trooper Hayhow with Pulliene 8:10am message according to Halam Parr it was delivered to Chelmsford at 930am so one can surmise Milne was sent up shortly after 930am by 10am he would of started his observation of the camp if I remember correctly he states he remained up there for around 45 minutes.

If this is correct 10am would be about the time Durnford arrives in camp and 11am is the Time Raw and Roberts left camp. the Discovery happening just before 12 noon

Milne made his report to Chelmsford before the battle even started which explains why the tents were still up

Please look into it, I may be wrong but I suspect not

INKY

Hi Kate
I have been trying to locate Chelmsfords orders stopping the wagons returning to RD. Smith Doiend original orders on the 21st were to deliver 45 waggons to iSandlwana and return with them. Earlt the next morning Chelmsford '"sent for me and told me not to take the waggons but to convey a despatch to Col Durnford."
Is this what you refer to when you say Chelmsford countermanded the order? If so I read this as him telling SD that the delivery of his message was of more import.
In his Memoires of 48 years service he comments further that "45 empty wagons stood in the camp withe oxen in.It was a convoy I was to have taken to RD for supplies early in the morning, but which was stopped until the enemy should be driven of.
I would therefore assume that the decision to stop that convoy was only made much later, again because of the context and location in the memoir it could well have been very late in the morning.
Brickhill makes mention of collecting the cattle, between 9 and 10, just as Durnford arrived.

Sorry if Im on my hobby Horse but the fact that Captain Gardner states that he delivered the message
and absolutly no reason to doubt that but other sources dispute the content leads to a possibility that it was being delivered at the same time Shepstone was delivering his report, sounds of firing were in evidence from the ridge and all this to the inexperienced Pulleine. It could be construed that the message could easily have been misconstrued or in the panic incorrectly delivered.
I also have a concern that in that message Chelmsford changes his whole concept on the warfare he is undertaking by issuing an instruction to Entrench. That goes against everything he has said and done before this point. Its not mentioned in Gardners evidence at the Court of Enquiry but is in his statement on the 26th January.

Cheers

Sorry looks as though messages have crossed. But anybody that believes a word said by Clery is deluded he covered Chelmsfords backside as part of a deal to protect Glyn. The points raised above clearly demonstrate that waggons had been prepared for a trip.
If that conversation place it becomes beyond belief that no thought was given to instructions for Pulleine. That Clery 'gave insructions to him' and didnt raise that concern with Chelmsford but was quite happy to discuss a wagon train beggars belief.

Cheers

Julian Whybra wrote:

SRB
Harness says that the order was only for 7 days' supplies to be sent out and that smith said he would go back to camp to ensure they were sent out.
The Narrative says that the men out with Chelmsford were to move to the new camp and that the message back to camp was for tents, equipage, etc., to be sent out (without specifying anything

Sorry to labour the point but according to the narrative (with a small 'n') the camp and dinner etc was supposed to be joining Lord C later in the day....so why specify '7 days' (an awful lot of stuff for the men and horses of the artillery)

More to the point why 'only'.....

Note the date Frank. Before the enquiry and before the full details of the disaster are known or anyone higher up has had a chance to influence him.
"I was sent back to Lt.Col. Pulleine with orders to bring on the tents and rations of the men out leaving the standing camp under Lt. Col Pulleine who was at once to entrench it"
Captain Alan Gardner Utrecht 23rd January 1879

Alan is given the message whilst out with LC and commits the message to memory.
What more do we need?
Anyway Brickhill's statement you quote above is rather vague and not as specific as Alan's various accounts.
"Pack up the camps" is that say just the camp of the 2/24th, artillery and IMI perhaps and who would be left behind?

Yes the wagons were due to go back to RD but having stripped the camp of half its force and having felt the need to call up Durnford's force why would he then deplete it further by sending off more men to escort the wagon train back to RD?
Doesn't make sense to me.

According to the Narrative - the infantry out with Lord C had one day's cooked rations.

Is it possible that Lord C changed his mind whilst out and decided to maintain the split in his forces?

There are certainly mixed and cross-messages revealed. This really does warrant a closer and more detailed examination than a quickfire to- and froing of posts can enhance. By all means keep going but I don't think a 'considered' outcome will be immediately forthcoming.
I do find it fascinating that a small but actually significant point which no-one has previously identified can generate so much controversy yet have so much depend upon it.

JW quote
"I do find it fascinating that a small but actually significant point which no-one has previously identified can generate so much controversy yet have so much depend upon it."

If this statement refers to the wagons going back to RD I raised this back in January 2022 see page 3
https://www.1879zuluwar.com/t10639p100-laagering-of-wagons-at-isandlwana-and-laager-commandants?highlight=laagering

It will form part of my forthcoming study paper about lagering of wagons and iSandlwana.

If it relates to Alan's message to Pulleine about the camp then this is covered in Rifle and Spear with the Zulu published in 2018 which has all of his letters reproduced in full.
Kate

As I said, probably not clearly, I believe that Gardner did have a message to deliver, largly as he has said. My point, contentious indeed, is that with all the confusion at the time was it A) delivered verbatim or B) not understood.
The reference to Entrench is clearly against Chelmsfords beliefs and will remain an enigma.
As far as Im aware Gardner arrived back at RD/Helpmakaar on the 25th the night before the Enquiry when ALL the board members had assembled along with Clery, Glyn, Crealock. Frankly if that lot didnt understand the magitude of the loss then who would?
I would repeat, Chelmsford left no instructions at all for Pulleine, Its Clery who later, after the battle was over, reveals that he issued instructions. Really a Major giving orders to a Colonel. But then decides he needs to chat with Chelmsford about the waggons? Definitly not credible.

Cheers

Sorry to repeat it Frank but in case you missed it note the date and location.
"I was sent back to Lt.Col. Pulleine with orders to bring on the tents and rations of the men out leaving the standing camp under Lt. Col Pulleine who was at once to entrench it"
Captain Alan Gardner Utrecht 23rd January 1879

So Pulleine is asked to do a job, entrench the camp with no NNC labour to assist. 600 or do white men in african conditions?
Again implausible and doubt Chelmsford would suggest it. IF it was suggested it would come from Clery or indeed an embelishment by i shall diplomatically call AN Other.

Here's my theory (FWIT)

HBP was going to join up with Lord C - or else why send him orders to entrench (something new to HBP). If the plan was to remain apart Lord C wouldn't he have discussed this with HBP (in the arguement/discussion with AWD - he does not mention entrenching).

Lord C is snooping around looking for Dartnells Zulus - who aren't there......Lord C 'knows' there are no Zulus behind him.....the area has been scouted (to a degree) and Dartnell never saw any, neither did Lord C himself.

At this point he decides to stay out - sends back ACG and GBH with instructions etc, wants 7 days rations for the RA (and the 2nd/24th camp).....to me the obviously intended the Curling RA at Isandlwana to stay there - else why ask for 7 days rations, if the whole RA was coming on.

I don't think he ever thought the Zulus would bring him to battle - he was worried that they would not fight - he was trying to bring them to battle.

What changed his mind?

Did Dartnells Zulus retire towards Ulundi and Lord C thinking they were the Zulu army (or a large  part of it) wish to engage it?

Cheers

Sime

Kate
OK then you receive a Brownie point. Congrats.  I couldn't find anything on that link related to moving camp (which is the small but significant point) though there was something about Clery cancelling the order to send the waggons back.
Now let me throw this into the mix:
Despatch, Chelmsford to Frere Rorke's Drift 23.1.1879 MS copy in TNA:
"I had previously sent direction...[word illegible] the camp struck and moved to the point where the force was then operating against 'Matyan'."
This is part of the "I regret deeply to inform you...a terrible disdaster" letter.

Frank wrote:

"Really a Major giving orders to a Colonel. But then decides he needs to chat with Chelmsford about the waggons? Definitly not credible."


It can be if in this case Chelmsford delegated to Clery the task of putting into words what Clery
felt would be what Chelmsford would want to order based on the general instructions coupled
with the circumstances of the time they orders were written. Orders are often written by ranks
lower than those to receive them (even with some permission to add what the commander did not say but may have been thinking (!), but then that would have been Crealock, so this is where the lack of credibility comes in.


Bob

Bob
So you're suggesting, if I read you aright, that Chelmsford intended the WHOLE camp moved; Clery's words, which Gardner delivered, altered this to tents just for the men out with LC; and Pulleine's line about 'cannot move camp at present' was what, simply conveying the fact rather than trying to be specific, he could do nothing at present? Yes?

Julian,

If you're asking about what I meant in my message immediately prior to yours that
I'm responding to now, no, I'm not saying anything other than that the officers who
actually write (or relay, or convey) orders on behalf of commanders can often be junior
in rank to the officer to receive the orders. The content of any orders given / written
by Clery for Pulleine is not anything I am questioning, nor whether or not he actually
did give any orders.

Bob

Milne was sent with his telescope to take a look **after** Pulleine's message of 8:30 am arrived
informing Chelmsford that Zulus were "advancing".

The information Milne brought back gave no indication anything serious was going on.

As for Chelmsford knowing his rear was in the clear, that may be true if you think of
his rear as the track plus maybe as much as four miles on either side - a corridor or swath.
But Zulus on the plateau and even in the place where they were assembled as the time they
were spotted by Raw(?) were in a position to easily move to the track and approach Chelmsford
instead of the camp. I'm not sure if Chelmsford thought of his rear in a narrow sense but
he was certainly in error in thinking that nothing major could take place behind him.

Bob

Hi

That is why I wrote 'knew' - I don't believe Lord C would have split his forces, even for the day, if he'd thought anything else.

That said, he felt confident enough that his force should be able to defend itself and a similar sized force was left behind at Isandlwana.

As for the HBP 8.30 message - the evening/night before he (Lord C) had received a message from Dartnell indicating that a large number of Zulus were near him (Dartnell believed so and had a very uncomfortable night). Lord C couldn't find these large numbers of Zulus but whilst scouting around he receives a message from HBP saying that a large number of Zulus were near him (so to speak).

Milne could see no evidence of this, though with hindsight, I feel (like Harness) that the later sound of artillery should have indicated that something 'was on'.

The fact that large numbers of Zulus appeared (or were thought) to have been moving on Lord C precipitated AWD riding out later on the 22nd (in his two pronged advance - East and North East ish)

I often wonder if there was any evidence of Zulu movement near Dartnell - flattened grass etc to indicate a large number of Zulus, though reading Frank's IStE, the British missed a massive trail through the grass*....

Cheers

*from the army heading to Isandlwana

Bob
Thanks for the clarification.

Reading through the CoE:

ACG says that he took a message back to HBP saying to send on the camp of those already out and 7 days rations.

Also Cochrane states that AWD took over command from HBP, when he arrived at Isandlwana.

But you all probably know that already...

SRB,

I agree that Chelmsford felt that the force left in the camp was capable of defending
against even a large attack, and that his own half of the Center Column was also
capable of defending itself if attacked. I, too, would have felt that same way but would
not have put one half miles away from the other. That wasn't exactly operating as a
single column, although smaller forces sent forward and to the flanks would have been
okay and would have to be.

As for what, exactly, Pulleine was supposed to pack up, if it were just the baggage etc.
for those units Chelmsford had with him, then he was prepared to have the Center Column
in three pieces for a time, and this when he knew Zulus were in the area, and that doesn't mean
Zulu vedettes and spies.

The part about seven days of rations is puzzling. That seems to indicate that Chelmsford
might have been expecting the advanced portion of the column to be away from the rest of
the column for some days, even if both halves move forward each day so as not to extend
the distance of separation. If the rest of the column was going to move forward as we all
expect it would, being one column after all, the seven days would be far more than needed
if the two halves were to combine no more than a few days later.

Regarding another point someone made, it is true that Chelmsford may have underrated the
aggressiveness of the Zulus due to what he witnessed in the Kaffir War, but I've never felt that he
thought the Zulus would be no different. His instructions to column commanders clearly show that he took their aggressiveness seriously, although the level of aggressiveness is what he did not know and he may have felt it would not be consistent.

I can't assume this, but he must have been aware of Blood River, for example, and other
smaller clashes over the decades, particularly if he had conversations with any Boers and even
seaoned colonial Brits. In short, he really had nothing to worry about concerning bringing them
to battle. Best way was to head for Ulundi in particular, and other permanent villages. This was an advantage Chelmsford and other had in that war, compared to the short wars in another country that will remain unnamed, in which villages were mobile and harder to locate, although you-know-who was good at finding them.

Bob T